USDC (USDC)

$0.999042  <+0.01%  24H

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  • Tobias Reisner FA_Analyst Derivatives_Expert A
     17.37K  @reisnertobias

    Stablecoin Landscape on Hyperliquid https://t.co/F7xvMHbgQb

     3  1  138
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Neutral
    Overview of Stablecoin Market Data on Hyperliquid Platform
  • Jacob Robinson Regulatory_Expert Media B
     6.96K  @JacobRobinsonJD

    I think there’s only one solution to the USDC freeze debate that avoids placing the burden of law enforcement onto private citizens (employees at Circle and Tether). The freeze decision has to come from law enforcement (which in turn needs a bunch of resources to move 50x quicker). Other option is to give issuers a safe harbor for good faith freezes. I hate to say the former. I hope the industry gets the latter. (and im open to better ideas) But law enforcement should do this job for the same reason we call 911 after bank robberies. They should respond after hacks ASAP with freeze orders like they respond to bank robberies with cop cars. It’s not easy to get there, but it’s possible. Consult with ppl like @zachxbt. Issuers like Circle would then respond to those orders. Let me explain my thinking. This is the only path where issuers are (a) forced to freeze quickly and (b) protected from liability for erroneous freezes because (c) govt decided to freeze and is responsible for that call, and (d) this

    Jacob Robinson Regulatory_Expert Media B
     6.96K  @JacobRobinsonJD

    @jerallaire would love to have you on Law of Code to discuss this.

     21  11  4.92K
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Bearish
    Suggest that law enforcement agencies lead the USDC freeze, relieving issuers of liability
  • Jeremy Allaire - jda.eth / jdallaire.sol Founder Tokenomics_Expert B
     176.34K  @jerallaire
    Jacob Robinson Regulatory_Expert Media B
     6.96K  @JacobRobinsonJD

    I think there’s only one solution to the USDC freeze debate that avoids placing the burden of law enforcement onto private citizens (employees at Circle and Tether). The freeze decision has to come from law enforcement (which in turn needs a bunch of resources to move 50x quicker). Other option is to give issuers a safe harbor for good faith freezes. I hate to say the former. I hope the industry gets the latter. (and im open to better ideas) But law enforcement should do this job for the same reason we call 911 after bank robberies. They should respond after hacks ASAP with freeze orders like they respond to bank robberies with cop cars. It’s not easy to get there, but it’s possible. Consult with ppl like @zachxbt. Issuers like Circle would then respond to those orders. Let me explain my thinking. This is the only path where issuers are (a) forced to freeze quickly and (b) protected from liability for erroneous freezes because (c) govt decided to freeze and is responsible for that call, and (d) this

     21  11  4.92K
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Neutral
    Suggest that law enforcement agencies lead the USDC freeze, relieving issuers of liability
  • Bill Hughes 🦊 Regulatory_Expert Researcher A
     8.80K  @BillHughesDC

    What’s happening today with crypto hacks and real-time money laundering arguably had a historical parallel to the early days of American law enforcement. Back then, criminals could exploit the fact that policing authority stopped at jurisdictional lines. A county sheriff might be in active pursuit, but the moment a suspect crossed into the next county, the chase often stalled. Not always because it was strictly illegal to continue, but because authority, coordination, and communication broke down at those boundaries. In practice, the system created friction that criminals could predict and exploit. Crypto operates in a similar kind of fragmented landscape, except the “jurisdictions” are not counties but blockchains, exchanges, and national regulatory regimes. When a hack occurs, funds can move across wallets, protocols, and borders in minutes. Law enforcement, by contrast, still operates largely within national legal frameworks, requiring warrants, inter-agency coordination, and often international cooperation. By the time those processes engage, the assets have already been bridged, mixed, or otherwise obfuscated. The criminal hasn’t just crossed a county line; they’ve crossed five legal systems and three technological layers in the span of an hour. The analogy becomes even tighter when you consider the lack of real-time coordination. Early law enforcement lacked radios, shared databases, or standardized procedures. Today, while blockchain analysis tools exist, there is still no fully unified, global response system that can act instantly across jurisdictions. Agencies may see the same transaction, but they do not necessarily have the authority or mechanisms to intervene simultaneously. This creates a modern version of the “boundary problem,” where speed and fragmentation favor the attacker. Historically, this problem was not solved by simply telling local sheriffs to run faster. It required structural changes. The development of doctrines like Fresh Pursuit allowed officers to legally continue across boundaries. More importantly, the rise of centralized and coordinated institutions like the Federal Bureau of Investigation created a layer of authority that could operate across states. Communication technologies, from telegraphs to radios, reduced the lag between jurisdictions. Over time, policing became less about isolated local authority and more about networked coordination. The crypto ecosystem is likely heading toward a similar inflection point. Effective responses may require something akin to “digital fresh pursuit,” where authorized entities can act across platforms and jurisdictions in real time, or at least fast enough to matter. It may also require stronger coordination between governments and private actors like exchanges, who are often the only ones capable of freezing or tracing funds quickly. Just as importantly, there may need to be new forms of supranational cooperation, since crypto transactions inherently ignore national borders. The key lesson from history is that the problem is not simply criminal ingenuity, but systemic lag. When enforcement is slower and more fragmented than the activity it is trying to police, gaps emerge. In the 19th century, those gaps were geographic. Today, they are digital and jurisdictional. In both cases, the solution lies in reducing fragmentation, increasing coordination, and aligning the speed of enforcement with the speed of the underlying system.

    Jacob Robinson Regulatory_Expert Media B
     6.96K  @JacobRobinsonJD

    Circle is being sued for allegedly allowing North Korean hackers to move $230 million in stolen USDC after the Drift Protocol hack. https://t.co/EjnYQAkX2m

     3  1  367
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Extremely Bearish
    Cryptocurrency enforcement faces fragmentation challenges, and Circle is sued for allowing hackers to move USDC.
  • Sir Khaycee Founder Educator B
     70.13K  @sirkhaycee
    Sir Khaycee Founder Educator B
     70.13K  @sirkhaycee

    The moment you register an API key, you've already compromised your privacy. For AI agents making hundreds of requests onchain, that exposure compounds fast. The Partner API v2 from @HoudiniSwap is the answer builders have been waiting for. Partner API v2 now supports the x402 payment protocol. This is a big deal for builders. Instead of registering accounts or managing API keys, you pay per request using USDC on supported EVM chains. One wallet. One signature.Full API access. Here's how it works: → Client makes a request without authentication. → Server responds with 402 and payment instructions → Client signs a USDC transferWithAuthorization ,no gas required → Client retries the request with the signed payment → Server forwards to facilitator for onchain verification → Facilitator confirms the USDC transfer → Server returns the requested data AI agents now have full privacy with Houdini. Currently live on @base with fees fully covered and that's just the beginning. More EVM chains are bein

     12  3  2.38K
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Extremely Bullish
    HoudiniSwap推出Partner API v2,实现AI代理私密、无Gas费USDC链上支付,已上线Base。
  • Zh0u DeFi_Expert Educator B
     8.94K  @Crypto_Zh0u
    Zh0u DeFi_Expert Educator B
     8.94K  @Crypto_Zh0u

    >> @onrefinance's TVL grew by 5x in less than a year TVL doesn't lie 👀 Currently there are a few ways to be positioned: > Directly deposit to their native vault: 10% APY + 1x OnRe Points > Lending to Kamino or Loopscale: 7.79%-8.35% APT + 3x OnRe Points > Looping on Kamino or Loopscale: 15-17% APY + 6x OnRe Points Personally I deposit to Loopscale USDC Vault + Looping there, to also farm Loopscale points My current Rank OnRe is Top 4000, will slowly put more there You can start here: https://t.co/OdjjOegLDB If you want to be positioned via Loopscale: https://t.co/KUlLl3xDB8

     8  2  395
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Extremely Bullish
    OnRe platform's TVL grew 5× within a year, offering high APY, author strongly recommends.
  • CBduck FA_Analyst OnChain_Analyst B
     14.77K  @CoinbaseDuck
    Alex D
     753  @0xpampa

    @USDC nice product but don't see why I would use this over https://t.co/sixsqBkpPo which charges 0 fees (and supports Solana) https://t.co/rOrrRB7hl0

     112  10  8.93K
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Neutral
    The tweet questions the competitiveness of USDC bridge service, and the image shows zero-fee bridging.
  • NEARWEEK Media Security_Expert C
     78.99K  @NEARWEEK
    Vadim Developer Researcher A
     11.29K  @zacodil

    The Rhea attacker was identified and returned the funds 3.5M USDC + 13.5K ZEC - to the addresses requested by the team on the day of the hack.

     114  7  12.07K
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Neutral
    Attacker returned 3.5M USDC and 13.5K ZEC, assets have been returned
  • Quadrix Media Influencer A
     4.09K  @Qu3drix
    Leo D
     135.63K  @Leooweb3

    Super bullish on USDC I think we see $5 by end of year https://t.co/2Hcfbb96cv

     2.31K  270  131.25K
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Extremely Bearish
    The author predicts, with a sarcastic tone, that the stablecoin USDC will rise to $5, accompanied by an exaggerated upward chart.
  • Vini B |「 thecoding 」 Developer Community Lead B
     11.06K  @vinibarbosabr

    This looks like the best and most-accurate explanation on the RHEA Finance hack so far, as we wait for @rhea_finance's postmortem — kudos to @Defi_Nerd_sec for that ## TL;DR + Only Rhea Lend (Burrowland margin trading) was affected. DEX (v2.ref-finance.near) and rNEAR untouched + Root cause: subtle bug in margin_execute_with_pyth → internal_margin_open_position + Route parser overcounted min_amount_out on repeated USDC hops → inflated Pyth safety check, but callback credited tiny actual return with zero revalidation + Fake pools used only as routing substrate ↓ ## TEAM RESPONSE + Paused lending/borrowing within hours + On-chain message to attacker + ~3.36M USDC + 1.56M NEAR already returned + Tether froze $3.29M USDT + Law enforcement notified + No open-source activity/fixes related to the hack yet ↓ ## BREAKDOWN Rhea Finance (a merge from Burrowland + Ref Finance) was exploited for~$7.6M in a sophisticated margin-trading attack The root cause was a critical validation flaw in Rhea Lend & Burrowland’s margin OpenPosition logic that followed these steps: (i) Attacker deployed 4 fresh fake fungible-token contracts (all sharing the same mock-ft code hash) and created a tight cluster of 25 new Ref pools (pools 8514–8538) around them + real assets like USDC and ZEC (ii) Using multiple short-lived worker accounts, they seeded liquidity, deposited collateral, and opened margin positions via attacker-controlled Ref V1-style swap routes (iii) The decisive bug: Burrowland’s get_token_out() and verify_token_out() logic overcounted min_amount_out across repeated intermediate hops that output the same token (USDC) + in one testnet PoC, it validated min_token_p_amount = 32,595,520,035,000,000,000,000 — but the actual USDC returned by Ref was only 7,925 units (over 4.1 million times smaller) (iv) Burrowland accepted the inflated minimum during Pyth-oracle pre-checks, opened the undercollateralized position, then credited the tiny real return in on_open_trade_return() without any post-swap revalidation (v) Attacker immediately withdrew, unwound the fake pools, and consolidated ~7.6M (USDC, USDt, wNEAR, ZEC) into collector address 31ac7a2705a0686ff427b1a52d3ffd1fcfaa4b1f3cb3e83a0f767494e724a540. + the collector has already returned 3.36M USDC and 1.56M NEAR to Burrow (txs confirmed on Nearblocks) and Tether ### Key on-chain path (one worker example): → setup_pools + seed_pools → deposit collateral → margin_execute_with_pyth(OpenPosition) → margin_execute_with_pyth(Withdraw) → remove_liquidity → withdraw → transfer to master Hopefully we will get more information and valuable lessons with RHEA's postmortem and upcoming fixes

    Vini B |「 thecoding 」 Developer Community Lead B
     11.06K  @vinibarbosabr

    @rhea_finance @Defi_Nerd_sec https://t.co/AJfPqeOHLS

    Vini B |「 thecoding 」 Developer Community Lead B
     11.06K  @vinibarbosabr

    @rhea_finance @Defi_Nerd_sec ‼️ UPDATE It looks like the amount stolen was ~$18.6M, per @QuillAudits_AI ~$6.0M USDC ~$5.9M USDt ~12,095 ZEC (~$4.2M) ~800K wNEAR + 1.7M NEAR wrapped mid-attack (~$2.5M) https://t.co/R5UHiGjJzV

    Vini B |「 thecoding 」 Developer Community Lead B
     11.06K  @vinibarbosabr

    @rhea_finance @Defi_Nerd_sec https://t.co/uMbbor0qYu

    Vini B |「 thecoding 」 Developer Community Lead B
     11.06K  @vinibarbosabr

    @rhea_finance @Defi_Nerd_sec ‼️ UPDATE ~$18.4M was the total amount drained, according to @rhea_finance The rest of the information matches @Defi_Nerd_sec's article above https://t.co/F04jTou0gG

    Vini B |「 thecoding 」 Developer Community Lead B
     11.06K  @vinibarbosabr

    @rhea_finance @Defi_Nerd_sec ❗️ UPDATE ~$10M recoverable at this moment, according to @aescobarindo and the team is "looking to secure the rest" https://t.co/ZlI1Xf57PD

    Vini B |「 thecoding 」 Developer Community Lead B
     11.06K  @vinibarbosabr

    @rhea_finance @Defi_Nerd_sec @aescobarindo all funds returned, apparently https://t.co/1u6qn6gHZQ

     31  2  3.49K
    Original >
    Trend of USDC after release
     Bearish
    RHEA Finance suffered a $7.6 million attack, with a portion of USDC/NEAR returned