Hyperliquid (HYPE)

Hyperliquid is still strong

Stay Hyperliquid https://t.co/bsJ9Ci3LN7

This thing is hard to be feasible in practice @Wuhuoqiu used to be a VC, so I will only speak from the VC perspective First premise: > First, VC investment itself is a kind of mutual‑splitting‑position attribute, essentially very similar to the old VDS "resonance" (newcomers can look it up) That is: the lower the tier, the higher the price, the larger the supply. But the premise is that the upper tier must be fully filled. The premium of the next tier over the previous tier is artificially set, not discovered by secondary‑market price discovery: For example, a public chain pre‑seed 50M, Seed 200M, TGE might be 500M. These valuations are set by the project team and exchanges. On this chain there are very mature liquidity solutions and 1.5‑level market "consensus" (e.g., OTC selling) VC business "earns" deterministic paper wealth that is not affected by secondary‑game dynamics > Second, especially North‑American VCs, they rarely use their own money; the vast majority is money raised at extremely low cost. This leads to a philosophy that often is: - Patience - Not afraid of a single project zeroing out - But they want a 100x upside as soon as they act Going back to Lao Bai's scenario, this approach is equivalent to: - The project only raises effective funding in the VC round - About 10‑20% of the original VC tokens are fully unlocked at TGE What problems does this cause? 1. TGE cannot offer a premium above the VC round Because the project only has the money raised at the VC‑round valuation, and this portion of tokens is unlocked on Day 1. Exchanges, retail investors, market makers and funding parties all know this. If there is a premium here, who pays for it? 2. No value for VCs who did not invest Since there is no deterministic next‑round premium for VCs, and even if TGE could pour everything to retail exit, the discounted prior VC round would not yield many multiples. There is no incentive for them to participate. 3. No benefit for the project team either Assume the project team does not act maliciously and wants a long‑term path. Original logic: - Do pre‑TGE farming to grow users - At TGE, circulating tokens consist only of the airdrop actually distributed + MM liquidity provision + exchange‑run token allocations, generally less than 10% (most often less than 5%) Current logic: - TGE must unlock 10‑20% of tokens - There is simply no budget to run months‑long user growth. The pre‑TGE farming that earned an ICO whitelist has historically only been possible for a handful of "king" projects in a bull market; generally you cannot hold market attention for that long. - You cannot cut the listing cost to a penny. - Unable to price high, meaning the project cannot leave enough market‑cap buffer before its own token unlocks. Whether it zeroes out or not, it’s equivalent to the team working hard for half a day while retail and exchanges take the money. If that’s the case, why would the project team waste so much effort raising money from VCs just to cover product costs? Secondary‑market games have no premium room whatsoever. The closest idea is a “money‑pump” like Slerf, Bome. Of course their thinking is opposite: they start with a high‑average‑cost FOMO game, push price up, then trap people before considering what product to build, aiming to list on more exchanges. This process does not need the project team, only market makers. That is why I think Hyperliquid’s HIP‑3 has the biggest product‑market fit.

By the end of December 2025, the perpetual DEX market has formed a CLOB (central limit order book) dominated landscape led by Hyperliquid, accounting for about 70-75% of market share. The AMM model has retreated mainly to long‑tail assets and retail‑friendly markets. We once thought GMX was the endgame, but now we see it was only a transition. Why does on‑chain trading ultimately revert to a "centralized exchange" experience? Let's briefly discuss the logic behind it and my observations on @StandX_Official. One sentence to explain the difference between AMM and CLOB models: AMM model: you are betting against a pool (smart contract). Prices are determined by a mathematical formula or oracle, and you can trade instantly without a counter‑party. CLOB model: you are betting against other traders or market makers. Prices are set by the limit orders of buyers and sellers, and a trade only occurs when someone takes the opposite side. Why does CLOB dominate the market? The main reason is pricing power. AMM is forever just a shadow of CEX; it relies on oracles to copy Binance prices. CLOB, by allowing market makers to place orders, can generate an independent primary price during major market moves. For institutions and professional traders, trading in a place without pricing power is like handing your neck to oracle attackers. For quant traders and market makers, AMM's capital efficiency is extremely low—LP funds must be locked 1:1 in the pool. In a CLOB model, capital turnover is very high. This is why on Hyperliquid we feel silky depth and ultra‑narrow spreads. "Let the professionals do professional work" is the fundamental reason CLOB wins. Is the current CLOB perfect? Not yet. Although Hyperliquid solved the "trading experience", if you don’t trade, your U (margin) sitting in the account is dead money. In traditional CLOBs, margin must sit idle to avoid liquidation, earning no yield and suffering inflation erosion. This is the problem the next‑generation Perp DEX aims to solve: extreme capital efficiency. StandX’s design philosophy was born for this: not only to build a high‑performance CLOB, but also a "yield‑earning margin". Their core DUSD is essentially a delta‑neutral, yield‑bearing stablecoin similar to Ethena. In StandX, you don’t need to deposit money into a savings product; your trading margin itself earns yield. If GMX is DeFi 1.0 (solved "can we play"), Hyperliquid is DeFi 2.0 (solved "is it fun"), then StandX points toward DeFi 3.0: a fusion of Trading + Yield. Not only earn from trading fees, but also capture the time value of capital.

A sleeping giant!

Hyperliquid. https://t.co/zuQep1Miru

My thesis is the perps dex will grown exponentially over the coming years to >$1 trillion especially if there is novel tech it’s a fight to take marketshare from cexs there is enough for hyperliquid, lighter, and aster to win